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CHANGE PLANNING · WORKED USE CASE · DRAFT

Substation automation (OT): from use case to profile

A grid operator plans the post-quantum migration of one substation automation system. For each communication path, the operator decides whether to migrate it in place, migrate only the key plane, carry it on a conduit, or replace the device at its next refurbishment. This is an operational technology (OT) use case in the change-planning group.

Choice of case

The OT use case is the substation automation system (SAS) of an electricity grid operator.

Candidate Case for it Case against Verdict
Substation automation (IEC 61850, IEC 62351) Energy is the first sector in NIS2 and the clearest high-risk case under the EU roadmap. Protection traffic is the hardest real-time case in OT. The security standards are published, so capability can be checked against them. The system is assembled by an integrator from several suppliers' products No open-source product with public crypto documentation as complete as Keycloak's Chosen
OPC UA plant cell (open62541) A real product with public documentation of its security policies It follows the same pattern as the Keycloak use case: one product that secures sessions. It would add little that is new to the method Kept as a possible second component
Water utility telemetry (DNP3, Modbus) High sector relevance Most of it has no cryptography at all. The planner would answer "carry it on a conduit" for almost every path, so the case would test too little of the profile Mention only
Secure remote access into OT Real harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure It is an IT product that sits at the OT boundary. It is too similar to the Keycloak use case Mention only

1. The decision being supported

A grid operator plans the PQC migration of one substation automation system: the station level, the bay level, and the link to the control centre. For each communication path it decides one of four actions:

The operator also needs to know whether any trust anchor will stay in service longer than the algorithm that protects it stays safe.

Consumer: the grid operator's protection and control engineering function, working with its system integrator. Supporting consumer: the national competent authority under NIS2, which uses the same facts in less detail.

The operator's questions:

  1. Where does asymmetric cryptography sit in this system, and which paths depend on it?
  2. Which of those can be migrated without replacing hardware, and what does each change cost in outage time and re-certification?
  3. Which paths can a conduit carry while the devices wait?
  4. Can each device accept firmware signed with a new algorithm? Can its trust anchor be replaced in the field?
  5. What blocks each step: the product, a standard, a provider, or certification?
one substation, two zones, one conduit station zone WAN Station server GDOI key server HMI · enrolment Station gateway IEC 60870-5-104 over TLS Engineering workstation Protection IED bay level Bay controller bay level WAN router the conduit IKEv2 Control centre GDOI group keys MMS over TLS MMS / TLS GOOSE, SV · multicast, MAC configuration, firmware IPsec tunnel TLS session key distribution symmetric multicast engineering conduit tunnel
The reference system. Protection traffic stays inside the station zone and is protected with a symmetric MAC. All asymmetric cryptography sits elsewhere: the group key distribution, the TLS sessions to the HMI (human-machine interface) and the gateway, the engineering download, and the tunnel that carries the control-centre link across the conduit. Values are illustrative.

The threats are weighted differently from the Keycloak use case. Protection and control traffic needs to stay confidential only for a short time. The quantum risk is that an attacker forges something that carries authority: firmware, configuration downloads, commands or group keys. The WAN link to the control centre is the main harvest-now-decrypt-later exposure. The profile asks for the facts for each purpose and does not rank them (decision 0002).

2. Producer constraints

There are two producers. The black-box constraint applies to both: each producer can describe only what it can see from its own position.

Constraints that shape the attributes:

Constraint Effect on the profile Source
GOOSE (protection event messages) and SV (sampled values) are authenticated with a message authentication code (MAC): HMAC or GMAC with group keys The data plane, meaning the messages themselves, is not a migration target. The key plane, meaning how the group keys are distributed, is a migration target. Keys reach devices through IEC 62351-9 group key distribution (GDOI, RFC 8052) IEC 62351-6:2020
GOOSE is a layer-2 multicast message with a 3 ms budget for trip messages Per-message signatures are not feasible. An ML-DSA-44 signature is 2,420 bytes. This limit will not change. The profile records it once, as an integration constraint IEC 61850-5 performance class P2/P3; FIPS 204
MMS and IEC 60870-5-104 run over TLS as profiled by IEC 62351-3:2023 A device can only claim 62351-3 conformance for the key exchange groups and signature schemes that the 62351-3 profile lists. That profile lists no post-quantum ones. Conformance to 62351-3 therefore blocks migration on its own, even if the device's TLS library supports post-quantum algorithms IEC 62351-3:2023
GDOI as used by RFC 8052 builds on RFC 6407 No post-quantum key exchange is defined for it. G-IKEv2 (RFC 9838) is the IKEv2-based successor. It mixes in preshared keys for quantum resistance, but it does not profile an ML-KEM exchange RFC 8052, RFC 9838
A device's firmware is verified by its bootloader or boot ROM If the verification algorithm and its trust anchor can be changed in the field, the device can be updated. If they cannot, the device must be replaced EU PQC roadmap: products should accept updates signed with quantum-safe algorithms
IEDs are certified per product version A change to cryptography can trigger re-testing (IEC 61850 conformance), re-certification (IEC 62443-4-2), or the operator's own type approval ISASecure CSA
Field life of 20 to 30 years, aligned to primary-plant refurbishment How long trust anchors stay valid, and when each device is due for replacement, matter more than product release dates
what is sent protected by keys or trust from post-quantum status GOOSE and SVtrip, sampled valuesHMAC or GMACwith a group keyGDOI key serverIKEv1 phase 1data plane resistantkey plane: standardMMScontrol, settingsTLS, IEC 62351-3ECDHE, ECDSAdevice certificateEST or SCEPblocked: standardRole-based accessIEC 62351-8token signaturetoken issuer keyblocked: standardFirmware imagesignature at bootkey and algorithmin boot ROM or loaderblocked: productor replace at refitControl-centre linkIEC 60870-5-104TLS inside a tunnelWAN routerIKEv2, the conduitcan move firsthybrid ML-KEM
Data plane and key plane. The protection messages that the 3 ms budget applies to already use symmetric cryptography, so they are not the migration target. Every asymmetric dependency sits one column to the right, where the keys or trust come from: key distribution, certificate enrolment, token signing and firmware verification. Most of those are blocked until a standard adds post-quantum algorithms. The only path that can migrate first is the control-centre link, by upgrading the conduit that carries it. Status values are illustrative.

3. From questions to attributes

The baseline attributes, which the pqc-migration profile already defines, answer most of the operator's questions. Only two new component attributes are needed. The system document adds two more.

What the operator needs to know Attribute Source
Which interface, of what type interfaceType Baseline
What it uses now and could use keyExchange, authentication, and their Supported forms Baseline
What blocks PQC, per purpose, and who can change it capabilityStatus, blockedBy, roadmapRef Baseline
Can it migrate while the other end still uses classical algorithms coexistence, negotiationControl Baseline. One-way multicast needs a defined value: not-applicable
What breaks if the cryptography changes integrationConstraints Baseline. Records the GOOSE frame size and timing limits as a structured entry
Which interface delivers this interface's keys keyStoreRef Extended. Promoted to MUST for group-keyed interfaces
Can the trust anchor be replaced in the field keyReplaceable IoT draft
Who can push an update, and how updateAuthority, updateMechanism IoT draft
Can the firmware verification algorithm change in the field verifierReplaceable New. yes, no (boot ROM), via-bootloader-update, unknown
What does enabling the capability cost in certification certificationImpact with certificationScheme New. none, retest, recertification, unknown
Which component interfaces are actually used usage System document. New. in-use, disabled, not-connected
Which conduit carries an inter-zone path, and which interface implements it conduitRef System document. New

Tried and rejected:

4. Profiles

There are two profiles: one for the component, one for the system.

pqc-migration-ot (component). It extends the change core monotonically: it adds rules and does not relax any (decision 0004). The core supplies the baseline capability attributes. It also supplies keyReplaceable, updateAuthority and updateMechanism, as conditional rules that apply to update interfaces.

Rule Requirement Level
Inherited All change-core rules, including the conditional update-path rules same as in the core
I-OT1 certificationImpact on every interface whose capabilityStatus is not not-planned MUST
I-OT2 keyStoreRef on every interface keyed by a group key service MUST
I-OT3 verifierReplaceable on every update interface MUST
I-OT5 Real-time limits stated in integrationConstraints where they exist SHOULD
P-OT1 Declare at least one update interface, or state why there is none MUST

sas-system (integrator). This is a derived overlay. An overlay is a document that adds facts on top of other CBOMs. It references the component CBOMs and does not copy them.

Rule Requirement Level
S1 Reference every component CBOM by link and digest MUST
S2 State usage for every interface of every referenced component MUST
S3 Declare zones, and for each inter-zone path name the conduit with conduitRef MUST
S4 Name the component that provides the key plane: the GDOI key server and the certificate authority's enrolment interface MUST
S5 State the IEC 62443-3-3 security level achieved by the system as delivered SHOULD

Dependencies:

component documents, one per supplier system document, from the integrator Protection IEDsupplier CBOM · pqc-migration-otBay controllersupplier CBOM · pqc-migration-otStation gatewaysupplier CBOM · pqc-migration-otStation serversupplier CBOM · pqc-migration-otWAN routersupplier CBOM · pqc-migration-ot cites by link and digest (S1) System CBOM · sas-system overlay Usage of every component interface: in use, disabled, not connected (S2) Zones, and the conduit each inter-zone path crosses (S3) Who provides the key plane: GDOI key server, enrolment (S4) IEC 62443-3-3 level as delivered (S5) States no fact a component already states Operator: how many substations use this design, and its migration register. Outside both profiles
Two kinds of document. Each supplier describes one product, which it can see in full. The integrator describes how the products are put together, and cites the supplier documents rather than repeating them. The system verdict covers the integrator's statements, and each component's own verdict is reported beside it, including a component that conforms to no profile.

No edge object. An edge object would treat a path between devices as an object with its own facts. The methodology does not define one. Decision 0026 represents a connection as the join of its two ends, through a peerInterface pointer in a deployment record, and leaves facts about a whole path to the inventory. In a substation every conduit is implemented by a device: a firewall, a VPN router or a gateway. A conduit's cryptography is therefore a fact on that device's interface, so this use case needs no more than that join. A fact that belongs to the path itself, such as an end-to-end GOOSE transfer time, would need more. That fact is an operator requirement, so it stays out of the profiles.

5. The worked example

The worked example is a reference SAS. It uses generic components, and its values are taken from the profiles in the published standards. Every value is marked illustrative until a supplier volunteers a real product.

Components:

Two zones: the station zone and the WAN.

the profile describes the boundary, not the box Protection IED firmware as shipped internals not disclosed and not required GOOSE trip messages (svc-goose) Sampled values (svc-sv) TLS for MMS (tls-mms) MMS, role-based access (svc-mms) Firmware update (upd-fw) Engineering download (mgmt-eng) GDOI group keys (int-gdoi) Certificate enrolment (mgmt-enrol) time synchronisation peer-ptp device keys, trust anchors sto-keys service management interconnect peer storage no cryptography
The protection IED as its supplier describes it: ten interfaces, described from the outside. The diagram has the same layout as the Keycloak diagram, but the cryptography is distributed differently. Most of the asymmetric cryptography is on the management side and in the key plane, not on the service interfaces that carry protection traffic.

Protection IED interfaces:

Interface Type Protocol Expected finding
svc-goose service GOOSE, IEC 62351-6 Integrity by HMAC-SHA256 with a group key. Already quantum-resistant. Its keys come from int-gdoi
svc-sv service Sampled values, IEC 62351-6 As svc-goose
tls-mms service TLS 1.2 and 1.3, IEC 62351-3 ECDHE and ECDSA. blockedBy: standard, because 62351-3 lists no PQC groups
svc-mms service MMS, with IEC 62351-8 role-based access tokens The token signature is what grants authority. blockedBy: standard
int-gdoi interconnect GDOI over IKEv1 phase 1 This interface is the key plane. blockedBy: standard. The successor, G-IKEv2, is published but not profiled for IEC 62351-9
mgmt-enrol management Certificate enrolment (EST or SCEP), IEC 62351-9 Device identity certificates with long validity. Can it enrol an ML-DSA certificate?
upd-fw management Firmware update verifierReplaceable decides update versus replacement
mgmt-eng management Configuration download from the engineering tool Often protected only by TLS and access control. Is the configuration itself signed?
peer-ptp peer IEEE 1588 time synchronisation Commonly no cryptography: none
sto-keys storage — Device private key and trust anchors. Is a secure element present? unknown is acceptable

What a planner is expected to conclude:

6. What the profiles deliberately exclude

7. Expressing it in CycloneDX

8. Proposed decisions and open questions

Proposed decisions (for a draft decision 0024):

Open questions:

  1. Does IEC 62351-9:2023 already profile G-IKEv2, or only GDOI over IKEv1? The answer changes the int-gdoi finding.
  2. Has IEC TC 57 WG 15 started PQC work on IEC 62351-3, -6, -8 and -9?
  3. Is certificationImpact a product fact, or a deployment fact that belongs in the system document?
  4. Should usage stay in the system overlay, or become a general facility for derived CBOMs?
  5. Who can bring a protection IED supplier and a transmission or distribution operator to review the draft? The best route is to ask named people directly.

Sources

PKIC CBOM Profiles Working Group · draft for comment.