Governance
Governance covers the processes and controls that apply to CBOMs and profiles over their lifetime: how they are produced, signed, distributed, changed and retired.
Revision states
A CBOM revision passes through four states. Governance controls each transition between them. In this methodology the word lifecycle is used only for the capture phase of a reported fact, which is a separate matter described under Lifecycle Data. A revision has states. A fact has a capture phase. The two are easy to confuse because the same word was previously used for both.
Validation is not a state
A document does not change when somebody validates it. Validation is applied to a published revision. It can happen any number of times, carried out by parties who do not coordinate with each other. Each validation produces a conformance claim, a recorded statement of whether the document met a profile. It does not move the document to another state. The producer and the curator control the four states. Each claim belongs to the party that made it.
Governance has to account for this difference. A revision is produced once, but it is used for as long as anyone keeps a copy. Two consumers who validate the same document against the same profile a year apart can reach different verdicts (pass or fail results), because the profile may have been revised in between. For that reason, a claim is bound to the digest of the document and records the exact profile version used.
A profile authority can change a verdict without anyone touching the document
When a profile authority tightens a published profile, existing revisions that conformed to it may stop conforming. The verdict changes even though no producer acted and no document changed. Only the profile authority has this power. No other role in the model can change a verdict in this way.
This power has two consequences. First, a profile authority that revises a published profile should state what happens to documents that conformed to the previous version. The profile does this with a grace period. It states a recommended period and the date it ends, and a contract may set a different one. Until that date the validator reports the tightened rule as a warning, not a failure. Second, the earlier verdict can be checked only if the superseded profile text is kept. That is the purpose of the archive obligation set out under "The archive obligation". Without the superseded text, the old claim cannot be reproduced, and nobody can show that the change was a tightening rather than a rewrite.
Where public and restricted variants separate
A CBOM can exist in two variants: a public variant that anyone may hold, and a restricted variant released only to named recipients. The two variants separate at Create, not at Publish. The markers that make a document public are written into the document itself. A producer therefore creates two documents, signs both, and publishes each to its own audience. The two must also be superseded together. If a new restricted revision is issued without a matching public revision, the public record describes a version that no longer exists.
This methodology does not cover how a producer makes the two variants. In practice, both are extracts taken from one inventory at two redaction settings. Governance covers the pair of documents that recipients receive and the relationship between them. See Confidentiality.
Roles
Two of the four roles, the producer and the curator, can move a revision between states. The consumer validates a revision but does not move it. The profile authority cannot move a revision either. It has a larger power instead: by revising a profile, it can change the verdict on revisions that nobody has touched.
| Role | Transitions it may cause | Responsibility |
|---|---|---|
| Producer | Create, Sign, revise | Generates the CBOM (build pipeline or scanner), and records provenance and the lifecycleStage of what it captured. |
| Consumer | None | Validates a published revision against the applicable profiles and records the conformance claim. Validating does not change the document, and a consumer may validate the same revision again whenever a profile is revised. |
| Curator / registry | Publish, retire | Stores, versions, and serves revisions, and enforces retention and access control. |
| Profile authority | None | Defines and versions profiles, and manages the controlled vocabulary and its deprecation. Revising a profile can change the verdict on every published revision evaluated against it. |
Integrity and authenticity (signing)
Signing is now an expected practice. The 2026 minimum elements guidance lists SBOM Author Signature among its minimum elements, defined as a digital signature attributable to the SBOM author, alongside SBOM Author, SBOM Tool Name and SBOM Tool Version. A bill of materials that cannot be attributed and verified no longer meets the stated baseline. See References.
A CBOM should be signed so that a consumer can verify its origin and detect subsequent modification. Two distinct objects may be signed:
- The CBOM document, by a detached digital signature over the serialized file, so that any alteration is detectable.
- The process that produced it, as a build attestation (for example, in the in-toto or SLSA model), so that the provenance of the CBOM is itself verifiable.
Signing depends on key management: the protection and rotation of signing keys, and a means for consumers to establish trust in the signing identity. Because the subject matter is cryptography, the signature algorithms are themselves in scope. A signature gives assurance only for as long as its algorithm remains strong. A CBOM signed with a classical algorithm can therefore be relied on only until that algorithm can be broken. For that reason, the choice of signing algorithm should follow the same rules as the cryptography the CBOM describes. The minimum elements guidance takes the same view, referring authors to the ENISA agreed cryptographic mechanisms for the signature itself.
Provenance
A CBOM should record how it was produced: the generating tool and its version, the inputs, the lifecycle stage at which it was captured, and any mechanical upgrade applied to it (see Versioning). Provenance supports both trust and reproducibility, and is a precondition for a meaningful conformance claim. The tool name and version are now named minimum elements, so a producer meeting the SBOM baseline already carries most of what a CBOM consumer needs to judge how the data was obtained.
Provenance also has to account for information that is missing. Where an attribute is unavailable, the record should state whether the producer lacks the information or is withholding it, rather than leaving the field empty. See the discussion in Challenges.
Relating a CBOM to an SBOM
Cryptography always lives in software or hardware. A CBOM is therefore of limited use unless the reader can reach the components that implement it. There is more than one way to arrange that, and the choice is a governance decision. It determines what is signed, who is accountable for which document, how often each is regenerated, and what a consumer has to fetch before it can act.
Four arrangements are in use. Arrangements A and B each produce a single document. Arrangements C and D each produce a pair of documents, with a reference from one to the other.
A · Unified document
One bill of materials contains both the software components and the cryptographic assets, with dependencies expressed between them. CycloneDX supports this directly, since cryptographic assets are components like any other.
The advantage is that there is no reference to resolve and no second document to keep in step. A single signature covers the whole claim, one author is accountable, and a consumer holding the document has everything it needs. The disadvantage appears when the two kinds of data have different lifetimes or different owners. A vendor's software inventory changes on release. A deployment's cryptographic configuration can change without any software changing at all. Binding them into one artifact forces the slower-moving part to be republished whenever the faster-moving part changes. It also means that a consumer entitled to the software inventory necessarily receives the cryptographic detail as well.
B · Standalone CBOM
The CBOM is a single document that describes cryptography without reference to any software inventory. This arrangement fits when the subject is not a piece of software. Examples are an operator describing the cryptography it observed on a service it did not build, or a survey of an estate built from network discovery.
It is simple to produce and to distribute, and it avoids publishing software composition that the producer may not wish to disclose. However, it cannot answer the question that usually follows. If an algorithm needs replacing, the next question is which library implements it and whether that library can be updated. A standalone CBOM does not carry that information. The profile asks for implementationPurl to reduce this problem. That attribute names the implementing package even when no SBOM is linked.
C · CBOM referencing an external SBOM
The CBOM is the entry point and carries a reference to the SBOM for the same subject. A consumer starts from the cryptography and resolves outward to component detail when it needs it.
The Keycloak product record is of this kind. It names the libraries that implement its interfaces, such as the OpenJDK 21 runtime in the image, so that rule I9 can be answered from the record itself. For the full component list it points to the companion SBOM of the same image, by BOM-Link and SHA-256 hash. Baseline rule R1 requires this pointer on every product record. See Context Pointers.
This suits consumers whose question is cryptographic: migration planners, and anyone assessing an interface rather than a release. The two documents keep independent lifecycles, so a configuration change can produce a new CBOM revision without reissuing the SBOM. The cost is that the reference between the two documents has to be kept correct. A reference that names a document but not its revision will sooner or later point at something that has changed. A consumer that cannot follow the reference is left with an incomplete picture, and nothing tells it that something is missing.
D · SBOM referencing an external CBOM
The SBOM is the entry point and links to the CBOM as an external artifact. This is the arrangement the site describes for SPDX, because SPDX 3.0.1 has no cryptographic object model, so the practical option today is an SPDX SBOM alongside a CycloneDX CBOM.
Its strengths are distributional. Existing supply-chain processes already request, store and verify SBOMs, so a CBOM reached from an SBOM inherits those processes rather than requiring its own. Access can also be separated, which matters when an organization is willing to publish software composition more widely than cryptographic configuration. The weakness is that cryptography becomes a secondary artifact. A consumer that stops at the SBOM, or whose tooling ignores unfamiliar external references, never sees the CBOM at all, and there is no signal in the SBOM that anything is missing.
Comparison
| Governance question | A · Unified | B · Standalone | C · CBOM → SBOM | D · SBOM → CBOM |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Documents to produce | one | one | two | two |
| Signature covers the whole claim | yes | yes, but the claim is narrower | no, each signed separately | no, each signed separately |
| Independent regeneration | no | not applicable | yes | yes |
| Separate access control | no | not applicable | yes | yes |
| Risk of version skew | none | none | present | present |
| Risk of the CBOM being missed | none | none | low | higher |
| Answers "which library implements this" | directly | only via implementationPurl | after resolution | directly, from the entry point |
| Available in SPDX today | no | no | no | yes |
Requirements that apply whichever is chosen
Where two documents are used, the reference between them needs governance. Without it, the reference becomes inaccurate over time.
- Pin the revision. A reference should identify a specific revision of the target, not merely the target. CycloneDX provides a link form, the BOM-Link
urn:cdx:<serial>/<version>, that identifies a BOM by serial number and version. Prefer it over a bare URL, and add a SHA-256 hash of the target. The Keycloak deployment records cite the records they build on in this way (decision 0025). When a consumer holds the cited record, the validator checks its serial number, version and hash. A cited record that has changed since it was cited fails the deployment profile's rule P1. - Give the pair a shared subject identifier. Both documents should name the same subject in the same way, so that a consumer holding one can find the other without following a link that may have rotted.
- State whether resolution is required for conformance. A profile should say whether an unresolvable reference is a failure or a warning. If the profile does not say, two consumers will reach different verdicts on the same document. The published profiles check the pointer and never the target. Where a value is inherited from a cited record that the consumer does not supply, the validator reports the value as open (unresolved) and does not fail it.
- Sign both, and record the relationship. Two signatures do not by themselves attest that the two documents belong together. The reference should be inside the signed content of at least one of them.
- Retain both documents for the same period. A retained CBOM whose SBOM has been deleted is an audit record that can no longer be interpreted.
The Keycloak product record uses arrangement C. Its SBOM already exists as a separate document, and the record's reference rules R1 and R2 are there to exercise the pointers. A producer starting from nothing should still prefer arrangement A for a product CBOM generated at build time.
Evolution and change control
Profiles, the controlled vocabulary, and the methodology evolve over time. Changes are managed through explicit versioning (see Versioning), recorded decisions, and, within the working group, lazy consensus (a proposal is accepted unless someone objects). When a requirement is tightened, it takes effect only after a dated grace window. Vocabulary values are deprecated rather than removed. Both practices make changes predictable and auditable. Publishing a new version in the register, with its changelog, counts as notice of the change. The register may also offer a feed that people can subscribe to. There is no duty to notify each user individually.
The working group's own record is kept in the repository. Decisions taken while drafting are written up in decisions/, one file per decision. Each file states the options considered and what reversing the decision would involve. A decision is superseded rather than deleted. Unresolved items are collected in the open questions register, and each one is mapped to the methodology aspect that tracks it. Profiles follow the same practice. The example baseline profile carries a changelog that classifies each change as tightening, relaxing, or editorial. A producer can then tell from the record whether a new version requires further work from it.
Stewardship of profiles and mappings
Change control describes what happens when a profile is revised. Stewardship describes what happens over the years in which the profile is in use. It is a separate question because a profile outlives the circumstances that produced it. A conformance claim made against a profile can be examined long after the group that wrote the profile has disbanded. The claim is meaningful only if the profile it cites can still be obtained in the form it had at the time.
Profiles and mappings need different treatment. A profile changes when its author decides to change it. A mapping changes because a carrier format changed. A carrier format is the concrete file format, such as CycloneDX or SPDX, in which a CBOM is written. Carrier formats change on a schedule that nobody in this working group controls. Mapping maintenance is therefore a continuing obligation. Profile maintenance is an occasional decision.
How profiles are looked after
| Area | How it works |
|---|---|
| Names | The consortium keeps a register of profile names under pkic.. Anyone else names a profile in a name space they already control, such as their own domain written in reverse. The prefix pkic.example is reserved for examples. |
| Ownership | Ownership is tiered. The working group owns the baseline. A sector body owns the profiles it derives. The consortium runs the register and the archive. |
| Succession | If an owner stops maintaining a profile for a stated period, or a working group or sector body closes, ownership passes to the consortium. |
| Signing and identity | The publisher signs each published profile, which shows who published it. A conformance claim records the hash of the profile text, which names exactly one version of one file. |
| Archive | The publisher keeps every published version available, through the register, addressed by version. See below. |
| Review cadence | A stated review period, and a review whenever a carrier format is released, so that a profile is examined on a schedule and not only when somebody notices a problem. Still to be set. |
| Deprecation and withdrawal | How a profile is retired, the minimum notice, and what becomes of claims that cite it. A withdrawn profile does not invalidate past claims, which were correct when made. Still to be set. |
| Statements about formats | Every statement about a limitation of a carrier format names the format version it describes. See below. |
The archive obligation
A conformance claim cites a profile version so that the result can be reproduced. An auditor examining a claim years later needs the text of that version as it stood when the claim was made, because a later version may require different things. If published versions are not retained and served, every claim becomes unverifiable as soon as the profile is revised. The conformance model depends on claims being reproducible.
Whoever publishes a profile therefore has an obligation. They must keep every published version available indefinitely, through the register, addressed by its version, and must never change a published version. A correction is issued as a new version. A claim records the hash of the profile text, so anyone can check the archived copy against it. Superseded CBOM revisions are treated the same way, for the same reason (see "Distribution, retention, and immutability").
Mappings track something the group does not control
A mapping states where each attribute sits in a concrete format. When CycloneDX or SPDX publishes a release, the mapping may become incomplete, or a limitation the documentation records may stop being true. The working group does not control either event.
So every statement about a limitation of a format names the version it describes, for example "CycloneDX 2.0 has no object for a cryptographic relationship". A statement written this way stays true of that version and never goes out of date. When a new release appears, the statement is checked against it, and is either repeated for the new version or left as history. No one has to watch the formats for the documentation to stay accurate.
Distribution, retention, and immutability
Published CBOM revisions should be immutable. A correction or update is issued as a new revision rather than as a change to the existing one. A new revision replaces its predecessor but does not delete it. The registry governs access control and retention. Retention of superseded revisions provides the audit trail on which progress tracking and incident investigation depend.
Immutability does not remove the obligation to correct. The minimum elements guidance expects organizations to accommodate updates to bill-of-materials data, including corrections, and expects authors to correct errors promptly. The two work together: the erroneous revision is retained for audit and a corrected revision supersedes it.
Conformance-claim governance
A conformance claim references the profile version, the carrier format version, and the CBOM content revision (see Versioning). Claims are recorded so that a stated result can be reproduced and audited. A claim that omits any of these three references is not reproducible. The form of a claim, the identification of the party making it, and the distinction between a self-declared and an attested claim are specified in Conformance.
A claim stays true about the exact revision it names. Nothing happens to it when a newer revision is published. Whether that revision is still current is a judgement, so it belongs in policy, not in the document. A consumer's policy can set its own limit, for example to accept only claims about a revision issued in the last twelve months.
Confidentiality and disclosure
Governance also addresses the boundary between disclosure and the protection of intellectual property. A profile sets the minimum that must be disclosed. Governance covers information beyond that minimum, including any redaction policy and the conditions under which more detailed CBOMs are shared. Confidentiality explains how a public and a restricted variant of one document relate to each other and to the profiles they satisfy. It also explains why two risks belong to governance rather than to a profile: the risk from combining many CBOMs (aggregation) and the risk from comparing successive CBOMs (differencing). Both are questions about distribution. See also the discussion of how much detail a CBOM discloses (depth of disclosure) in Challenges.