Overview
A Cryptography Bill of Materials (CBOM) profile defines the subset of attributes that a CBOM is required to contain for a stated objective. It establishes a minimum reporting requirement rather than exhaustive coverage. The methodology is worked through one example: the Keycloak 26.7.3 identity server. Its CBOMs are expressed in CycloneDX 2.0 and evaluated against a family of small, product-independent profiles.
Scope of this documentation
The example profile, the Interface Disclosure Baseline, requires a product to declare its cryptographic interfaces, including the interface used to configure the product, and to describe each one. It does not reference a specific product or interface instance, and therefore applies to any product that terminates TLS, SSH, or IPsec. Keycloak serves only as the example subject. The vendor of Keycloak writes the product record. An operator writes deployment records for what it configured and what it observed, and each deployment record cites the records it builds on. A single CBOM may satisfy several profiles at once.
The sidebar lists the sections in the order a newcomer should read them. Concrete examples come first. Definitions come last, under Reference, so that you can look up a term when it is unfamiliar.
Suggested reading paths
Each section can be read on its own. You can read the sections in sidebar order, or follow one of the three routes below. Each route suits a particular role, and each assumes you have read the Introduction.
| If you are | Read in this order | Why this route |
|---|---|---|
| Producing CBOMs a vendor, or a build or release team |
Model → Profile → Maturity → Confidentiality → Formats → Versioning |
|
| Requiring and reading CBOMs an operator or buyer assessing a supplier, an auditor or regulator |
Use Cases → Challenges → Profile → Conformance → Maturity → Confidentiality → Vulnerabilities → Context Pointers → Governance |
|
| Writing or approving a profile working group members, sector bodies |
Model → Method → Profile → PQC Migration → Governance |
|
Two sections are not part of any route. Read them when the topic comes up. Data Exposure is a design note on the harvest-now-decrypt-later threat and the data attributes needed to measure it. Related Work explains how CBOM profiles relate to other PKI Consortium work.
Contents
Introduction
A worked example. A buyer asks a question about one product, and the product's CBOM cannot answer it. The example shows why, and how a profile makes the answer possible.
Demo
The reports the reference validator produced for the Keycloak records. They show a conforming product record, a record with its management interfaces missing, the four disclosure outcomes (value, withheld, unknown and undeclared), a design record, the deployment records and the CycloneDX 1.7 legacy form.
Use Cases
Why every profile starts from a use case: a named consumer and the decision that consumer has to make.
Challenges
What SBOM adoption has taught, the further difficulties that are specific to cryptography, and the limits of current CBOM standards. These problems are the reason for a profile-based approach.
Inventory
How a CBOM differs from a cryptographic inventory. CBOMs feed an inventory. An organization can also extract a CBOM from its inventory for a particular consumer: an internal team, a client or auditor, or a customer in its supply chain.
Lifecycle Data
Cryptographic facts are captured at four stages: design, build, deployment and operation. What each stage can show, who captures it, and why the stage is recorded with each fact.
Model
The three terms the methodology is built on: a cryptographic relationship (where cryptography is applied between two parties), the endpoints at each end, and the cryptographic assets it uses. Illustrated with worked examples.
Objects
A reference list of every object the methodology defines. For each one: which party or tool creates it and how it is identified. Also lists what the methodology deliberately leaves out.
Profile
The rules of the example profile, for the product as a whole and for each interface. The same rules serve two purposes: a specification for the party that produces a CBOM, and a checklist for the party that checks it.
Conformance
What can be assessed, what a pass or fail result means, who may claim conformance, how a claim is recorded, and what a passing result does not tell you.
Maturity
How to publish a family of profiles that ask for progressively more detail. A supplier can start with a profile it can meet now and move to more demanding ones later. A buyer can see which profile a supplier has met.
Confidentiality
Most suppliers will publish one version of a CBOM and release a more complete version only under agreement. How a profile marks the attributes a supplier may withhold, and what a consumer can tell from the version it holds.
Policy Evaluation
Why a judgement such as "this interface is post-quantum safe" is not stored in a CBOM. The criteria change over time, so the judgement is made by an external, versioned policy applied to the facts in the CBOM.
Vulnerabilities
How information about cryptographic weaknesses is linked to a CBOM. The three documents involved (the CBOM, the advisory and the VEX statement) and who writes each. The difference between an implementation bug and a weak choice of algorithm. What a conforming CBOM does not tell you.
Context Pointers
What a CBOM points to and does not carry: the SBOM, vulnerability statements, advisories, configuration guidance and the records a deployment record cites. Each kind of pointer, how it is carried in CycloneDX, and why conformance checks the pointer and never the target.
Method
The procedure for writing a profile: twelve steps in five stages (scope, content, rules, realisation and proof). Each stage has tests to apply, and the common mistakes are listed.
Worked use cases
Use cases taken through to a finished profile, in a separate section. PQC migration is complete. Procurement and deployment disclosure have published profiles. IoT device estates and substation automation are drafts.
Formats
Where each attribute of one profile is written in CycloneDX and in SPDX. Neither format has an object that represents an interface, so both attach interface attributes to the protocol asset, and some facts about a connection cannot be recorded.
Data Exposure
Traffic recorded today can be decrypted once a quantum computer exists. The algorithms in a CBOM do not show this exposure on their own: it also depends on how long the data must stay confidential and whether the traffic can be captured. A design note on the data attributes needed to measure it.
Versioning
Three things carry their own version: the document format (for example CycloneDX 2.0), the profile, and the CBOM's content. How a profile declares the format versions it accepts, so that a tool can check this automatically.
Governance
How CBOMs and profiles are managed over their lifetime: signing and provenance, how a CBOM relates to an SBOM, change control, retention, and who maintains a profile after publication.
Terms
Definitions of the terms used across the methodology, every attribute and its permitted values, and the terms the methodology considered and chose not to use, with the reason for each.
Related Work
How CBOM profiles relate to the PQC Maturity Model and other PKI Consortium work, and where one depends on another.
Files
The profile rules files, the Keycloak example CBOMs, the policies and their results, and the tools, with the commands to reproduce every result in this documentation.